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Mending “Broken Britain”: From the Respect Agenda to the
Big Society
Judi Atkins  argues that David Cameron’s conception of a ‘broken Britain’ and the Big
Society have ideological underpinnings that suggest that he is best seen not as the ‘heir to
Blair ’, but as the ‘son of Thatcher ’.
Addressing the Centre f or Social Justice in 2006, David Cameron argued that ‘we have to
show a lot more love’ towards disaf f ected young people. Although subsequently derided
as his ‘hug a hoodie’ speech, Cameron’s words signalled a departure f rom his party’s
tradit ionally punitive stance on law and order. This was a blatant attempt not only to seize
the centre ground f rom New Labour, f or whom ‘tough on crime’ had gradually taken precedence over
‘tough on the causes of  crime’, but also to build a new consensus on this issue. Cameron based his
approach on an account of  ‘broken Britain’, which borrowed heavily f rom New Labour’s narrative of
social exclusion. However, a closer examination of  Cameron’s rhetoric reveals that his conception of
Britain’s problems and his solution to them – the Big Society – are rooted f irmly in Thatcherite ideas.
As leader of  the opposition, Cameron repeatedly promised to mend our ‘broken society’.  This term
encapsulates a variety of  social ills, including high crime, f amily breakdown, chaotic home environments,
and drug abuse.  These are the same dif f icult ies that New Labour associated with social exclusion and,
by presenting them in list f orm, Blair and Cameron were able to assign to them a single cause.
While Blair blamed a lack of  respect that stemmed f rom the crude individualism of  the Thatcher
governments, Cameron attributes these problems to a decline in personal and social responsibility. This,
he argues, was caused by excessive state interf erence in people’s lives, which had sapped responsibility
and undermined innovation. The same argument also appears in Mrs Thatcher ’s 1976 party conf erence
speech where she contended that Britain’s ‘posit ive, vital, driving, individual incentive’ had been ‘snuf f ed
out by the Socialist State’.
For Blair and Cameron, the only solution to Britain’s problems was cultural change.  Through its Respect
Agenda, New Labour advanced a model of  active social democratic cit izenship, in which strong
communities are f ounded on reciprocal rights and responsibilit ies. Central to this strategy was the
inculcation of  civic virtues – good manners, a respect f or other people, their privacy and their property,
and an awareness that the rights of  all cit izens come with responsibilit ies – in those individuals who
behave anti-socially. To this end, claimed Blair, government needed to work in a ‘more coherent,
integrated way, across departmental boundaries, and with all the agencies – public, private and voluntary’
to tackle social exclusion and promote ‘respect’.
To a large extent, the ‘Big Society’ is a continuation of  the Respect Agenda, in that it emphasises strong
values and greater responsibility. It also seeks to diversif y the provision of  public services. As the 2010
Conservative Party manif esto puts it, ‘we will redistribute power f rom the central state to individuals,
f amilies and local communities’. By promoting social responsibility in this way, it continues, a
Conservative government could ‘rebuild shattered communities and repair the torn f abric of  society’.
Unlike New Labour, however, Cameron’s Conservatives envisage a f ar smaller role f or the state, which is
captured in the phrase ‘the Big Society, not big government’. This is consistent with the long-standing
Conservative (and Thatcherite) commitment to roll back the f rontiers of  the state which, its proponents
claimed, would allow individual init iative to f lourish.
Since 2010, Cameron has spoken of  a ‘Big Society spirit ’ of  ‘activism and dynamism’ and, in his 2011 party
conf erence speech, he suggested that it is inherent in the Brit ish people:
‘Some say that to succeed in this world, we need to become more like India, or China, or
Brazil. I say: we need to become more like us. The real us. Hard-working, pioneering,
independent, creative, adaptable, optimistic, can-do. That’s the spirit that has made this
United Kingdom what it is: a small country that does great things; one of the most incredible
success stories in the history of the world. And it’s a spirit that’s alive and well today.’
These qualit ies bear a striking resemblance to the ‘vigorous virtues’, which Shirley Robin Letwin lists as
‘upright, self -suf f icient, energetic, adventurous, independent-minded’.  Letwin explains that Mrs Thatcher
viewed a def iciency of  these virtues as the main danger threatening Britain in the late 20th century, and
perhaps held parts of  the Brit ish establishment – such as the BBC, the trade unions, and local
government – responsible f or their decline. The Thatcherites also believed that ‘Brit ish society should be
organised in such a way that individuals who do practise the vigorous virtues have room to f lourish’, and
that this would ult imately restore Britain’s posit ion as a ‘self -suf f icient and respected island power’
(1992, pp. 33-4, 36-7). These belief s are echoed in Cameron’s claim that greater personal and social
responsibility, in conjunction with a smaller state, is the starting-point f or building a better Britain.
Overall, it  appears that the Big Society is at its heart a Thatcherite project. Indeed, it is worth noting that
the remit of  the Big Society has expanded signif icantly since the f ormation of  the Coalit ion. Prior to this
time, it was presented as a solution to the problems of  ‘broken Britain’. However, it now encompasses
the provision of  a range of  public services, as Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ speech of  19 July 2010 makes
clear.
So I ask [local communities]: ‘what powers do you want? What more do you want to be able to do?’ It ’s by
asking those questions that you arrive at so many of  this coalit ion’s most transf ormative ideas. New
powers f or local communities to take over the running of  parks, libraries and post of f ices. More powers
to plan the look, size, shape and f eel of  housing developments. Powers to generate their own energy
and have beat meetings to hold police to account. These ideas signal the most radical shif t in power
f rom central government to neighbourhoods.
So, although Cameron’s narrative of  ‘broken Britain’ and the Big Society owes much to New Labour, its
ideological underpinnings suggest that he is best seen not as the ‘heir to Blair ’, but as the ‘son of
Thatcher ’.
This is seventh in a series of posts by contributors to the recent ‘Conservatives in Coalit ion
Government’ conference organised by the Polit ical Studies Association Specialist Group for the
study of Conservatives and Conservatism and the Centre for Brit ish Polit ics at the University of
Hull. The views expressed are those of the author alone and not those of the Polit ical Studies
Association or the University of Hull.
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